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a b s t r a c t 
Formal education is often viewed as a proxy for the quality of leaders. Recently, candidates 
with low education levels have been disqualified from contesting local elections in some 
states in India. But there is no conclusive evidence linking education to the effectiveness 
of leaders. Against this backdrop, we investigate whether having educated political lead- 
ers in the state legislatures in India improves education outcomes. Using comprehensive 
data on various outcomes such as learning levels, enrollment, school funding and infras- 
tructure, we find that the effectiveness of educated leaders depends on the initial level of 
development of the state. Educated leaders yield better education outcomes for their con- 
stituents only in those states where the initial level of development is high. There is no 
impact of educated leaders in less-developed states or in the overall sample. Our identifi- 
cation strategy is based on an instrumental variable that exploits the quasi-experimental 
election outcomes of close elections between educated and less-educated politicians. The 
results are consistent throughout various robustness analyses. These findings have implica- 
tions for recent policy changes mandating minimum education requirements on candidates 
in two states and similar proposed changes in other states. 
© 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 “Those who insist on literacy as a test and insist upon making it a condition precedent to enfranchisement in my opinion,
commit two mistakes. Their first mistake consists in their belief that an illiterate person is necessarily an unintelligent
person Their second mistake lies in supposing that literacy necessarily imports a higher level of intelligence or knowledge
than what the illiterate possesses.” – Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, Chairman of the drafting committee of the Indian Constitution, in
1928 to Simon Commission. 
“It is only education which gives a human being the power to discriminate between right and wrong, good and bad.” –
The Supreme Court of India in 2015 upholding the law mandating minimum education level for candidates in local elections.
1. Introduction 
Two states in India – Haryana and Rajasthan – recently mandated minimum education requirements for contesting local
body elections, and another state, Assam, has proposed that candidates to state legislature should be at least college grad-
uate. 1 These requirements alter the identity of citizens who enter politics, change political selection, political competition∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: rahul.lahoti@gmail.com (R. Lahoti), soham.sahoo@iimb.ac.in (S. Sahoo). 
1 The policy was implemented in the local body election of Rajasthan in 2015 and Haryana in 2016. However, the ruling party of the 
state government in Rajasthan was changed in the 2018 state-election, and the new government has decided not to implement the policy 
in future local body elections in Rajasthan. Regarding the proposal in Assam, see: http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics- and- nation/ 
only- graduates- those- with- up- to- 2- kids- may- get- to- fight- assam- polls/articleshow/58212862.cms 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.03.026 
0167-2681/© 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 
R. Lahoti and S. Sahoo / Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 176 (2020) 42–62 43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 and the role of dominant groups in the society. 2 Also by changing who is elected as leader it would also have an impact
on the efficiency of political office and the priorities of leaders. The Supreme Court of India upheld the law observing that
education was a precondition for efficiency and honesty and that it would “enable the candidates to effectively discharge
duties of the panchayat”. 
The education requirement and the Supreme Court judgment have been controversial. Many have argued in articles and
debates that the law and decision are discriminatory, retrograde, disenfranchising, elitist, unconstitutional and undemocratic
( Baxi, 2015; Abdul, 2015; Jaffrelot, 2016; NDTV, 2016 ). The argument for imposing education requirements on candidates
contesting elections rests on the premise that formal education makes leaders competent, honest and accountable. Formal
education is seen as a desirable characteristic which is argued to increase the quality of politicians. Educated politicians
are seen as more effective at designing and implementing policy, understanding concerns of citizens, dealing with complex
policy issues and are considered more accountable. We do not directly test the likely impact of this particular policy in this
paper, but analyze the underlying rationale behind the policy that links formal education of the leader with competency. 
The existing literature has often considered education to be a proxy for the quality of a leader ( Atkinson et al., 2016;
Besley et al., 2005 ). However, there are only a few studies that specifically analyze the impact of formal education of the
leader on outcomes, and they give conflicting results. Using data on education of national leaders in a cross-country database
and random transitions, a few studies have shown that educated leaders tend to increase economic growth, foreign invest-
ment and education attainment of citizens ( Besley et al., 2011; Diaz-Serrano and Pérez-Reynosa, 2013; Congleton and Zhang,
2013 ). These studies only analyze national leaders across countries where disparities across nations are difficult to account
for and also they do not analyze the impact of state or local leaders’ education. But Carnes and Lupu (2016) investigating
the impact of education of political leaders at national, state and local levels in different contexts find educated politicians
to perform neither better or nor worse than less-educated leaders across a range of outcomes. Impact of education of the
leader on development outcomes has not been studied systematically in India, even though various other characteristics of
the leader such as gender, religion, caste and criminality have been extensively studied. 
The aim of the paper is to test the hypothesis that educated politicians are more competent and deliver better outcomes
for their constituents. We investigate whether state legislative representatives, referred to as Members of the Legislative
Assembly or MLAs, with higher levels of formal education are better for school education outcomes in the districts from
which they are elected. In a patronage democracy like India, the effectiveness of public service delivery depends on the
intermediation via local politicians who have significant capacity to influence distribution of resources towards their own
constituencies ( Bussell, 2019 ). If leaders with more formal education have greater competency and they utilize it for the
benefit of their constituents, then one might expect better education outcomes due to having more educated leaders. 
We combine data on various schooling outcomes from multiple sources with information on politicians and election
outcomes. We use data on learning and enrollment outcomes of children in rural areas from the Annual Status of Educa-
tion Report (ASER) from 2006 to 2014. Additionally, we use annual data on school infrastructure and funding from District
Information System of Education (DISE) which is a census of all recognized schools from 2006 to 2014. Along with these
outcomes, we use data on leaders’ education level from Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) from 2004 to 2014. The
merged data-set allows us to examine at the district level the effect of political leaders’ education on education outcomes
over almost a decade. We specifically compare the performance of leaders who are college-graduate (graduate) with those
who are not college-graduate (non-graduate). 3 We use the graduate cut-off for leader’s education because approximately 59
percent of leaders are graduate; hence it allows us to exploit maximum variation in leader’s education level. 4 Besides, it
also helps us to connect to the relevant literature analyzing the effect of graduate leaders ( Carnes and Lupu, 2016 ). 
The main identification challenge is that the education level of leader could be correlated with voter preferences and
hence endogenous. To identify the causal impact of educated politicians, the share of constituencies in the district won
by graduate leaders is instrumented with the share of constituencies in the district having graduate leaders who won in
close elections against non-graduate leaders. The validity of the identification strategy relies on the assumption of quasi-
randomness of the outcome of a close election ( Eggers et al., 2015 ) – that the preferences of voters who elect a graduate
politician in a close election can be assumed to be the same as the preferences of voters who elect a non-graduate leader
in a close election. We test these assumptions extensively and show that results of close elections cannot be predicted on
any observable characteristics and are quasi-random. We also obviate the concern that the effect of graduate leaders may be
due to differences in other characteristics of the leaders, by showing that other characteristics of graduate and non-graduate
winners in close elections are similar. This strategy has been used extensively in the literature to study the impact of other
characteristics of politicians on various outcomes ( Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras, 2014; Clots-Figueras, 2012; Prakash et al.,
2019 ). 2 In Haryana the education requirements in terms of years of schooling were – 10 years for general candidates, 8 years for women and Scheduled Caste 
men, and 5 years for Scheduled Caste women. Due to these restrictions, more than 50 percent of women, 68 percent of Scheduled Caste women and 41 
percent of Scheduled Caste men were disqualified from contesting elections in Haryana ( Bhaskar, 2016 ). This also led to higher proportion of elections 
being contested by one or no candidates and lower electoral competition. 
3 In the context of India, a college-graduate individual has at least a Bachelor’s degree or a diploma, and is referred to as a ‘graduate’, a term that we 
use throughout this paper. 
4 More details on the distribution of education level of leaders are provided in the data section. In the robustness section, we also estimate the effect of 
alternative levels of education of the leader. 
44 R. Lahoti and S. Sahoo / Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 176 (2020) 42–62 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 We chose to analyze outcomes in education because of its importance to development, the availability of disaggregated
data, and the ability of MLAs to impact education outcomes in their respective constituencies. Comprehensive and reli-
able data disaggregated at district and lower levels are available for education. MLAs have the power to impact education
outcomes through lobbying for funds for schools in their districts, implementing education schemes, monitoring education
policy implementation and influencing bureaucracy. 5 This can be through their formal role as ex-officio heads of district
education committees and through informal influence on the bureaucracy ( Bussell, 2019 ). It can also be through the role
of politicians in hiring and management of teachers. Local politicians play an important role in teacher transfers in most
states in India and thus they impact students’ learning scores ( Fagernäs and Pelkonen, 2018; Ramachandran et al., 2015 ).
Clots-Figueras (2012) has shown that female MLAs are able to improve education outcomes more than male leaders using
similar identification techniques. Bhavnani and Jensenius (2015) also study the impact of state level leaders from the ruling
party on literacy over the long term. 
Indian states display a huge degree of diversity in various aspects. The level of political and legal institutions, norms,
voter expectations, awareness and literacy vary across states. Hence we investigate whether the effect of educated leaders
differs by states’ development level. We find that the impact of educated leaders depends on the initial level of development,
proxied by the baseline Human Development Index, of the state. In the most developed states, having more educated leaders
results in significantly higher learning levels (reading, maths and English scores) among children in the district. An additional
educated leader in the district increases the number of children aged 6–10 years who can read a paragraph in their native
language, do division and read an English sentence by 4.4–7.5% ˙Educated leaders in the most developed states also lead to a
statistically significant but small positive impact (0.1 percentage points) on enrollment rate. 
Educated leaders can directly impact investment in schools and monitor the local schooling system better which may
explain their impact on learning levels. We explore this channel and find that indeed there is a positive effect of educated
leaders on the number of schools, infrastructure in schools and funding for schools in the districts of the most developed
states. Other potential channels that we cannot test with the data include impact of leaders through hiring, management
and transfer of teachers that have been shown to impact learning outcomes ( Fagernäs and Pelkonen, 2018; Ramachandran
et al., 2015 ). But educated leaders do not seem to have any effect in the less developed states. Also in the overall sample of
all states, the effects are imprecise and negligible in magnitude. 
The robustness of these results holds up to a number of specification tests, alternative measures of key variables and
varying definitions of close election. Since education outcomes might take time to change, we also examine the impact of
leaders from different lag periods. The positive impact of educated leaders in most developed states, while no significant
effect in less developed states, holds for all of these cases. 
Our results suggest that pre-existing institutional and economic differences across states influence the effectiveness of
political leaders. We postulate that constituents in the most developed states may value education more than in less devel-
oped states, and educated leaders – being better leaders – deliver on the needs of their constituents. Having higher levels
of human development, citizens from the most developed states may have higher intrinsic preference for education, making
it a politically salient issue. Besides, the constituents and the leaders may manifest higher preference for education because
the economy in the most developed states is more service sector oriented, therefore education may play a greater role in
people’s livelihood in these states. For similar reasons, the actual or perceived returns to education could be higher in the
most developed states. In a similar setting, Prakash et al., 2019 also find that the impact of politicians varies by the level of
development of states. They find that the negative impact of electing criminally accused politicians is concentrated in less
developed and the most corrupt states. The literature on the political economy of public education spending also suggests
that leaders may invest on education differently based on the income level of the electorate. Bursztyn (2016) finds that in-
vestment in public education increases the probability of re-election of leaders only in high-income municipalities of Brazil.
The author argues that while the policy of higher public spending on education may be preferred by the rich voters, the
poor voters may prefer the government to allocate resources towards redistributive programs that increase their incomes in
the short run. 
Another reason for educated leaders to perform better in the most developed states could be that a minimum level
of development is necessary for results of their effort s to manifest. In the most developed states, per student expenses,
basic schooling infrastructure, teacher management regulations and baseline learning levels are better than other states,
which might have helped educated leaders in delivering improved education outcomes. Additionally, the most developed
states tend to have better-quality educational institutions. The marginal value of a graduate degree is likely to be positively
correlated with the quality of education, thus making the effectiveness of graduate leaders, as compared to non-graduate
leaders, more salient in the developed states. 
Our findings indicate that educated leaders are not necessarily always better. The impact of educated leaders varies by
context and a more nuanced understanding is required before taking the education level of politicians as a proxy for their
quality. From a policy perspective, our findings suggest that restricting the choice of voters to only those leaders who are
formally educated may not always lead to better development outcomes. Restricting choice can have broader implications
on right to vote and contesting elections. The evidence of impact of educated leaders is not overwhelming to justify the5 An average state in India spends about 16% of its total budgetary expenditure on education, with substantial variation across states from 10% to 23%, 
as revealed by recent statistics released by the Reserve Bank of India. 
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 restrictions on contesting elections imposed in two states in India. Also beyond India evidence of the impact of educated
leaders is not conclusive ( Carnes and Lupu, 2016; Gallego and Curto-Grau, 2019 ). Erikson and Josefsson (2019) show that
in Swedish Parliament though higher education helps Members of Parliament in processing information, yet MPs without
higher education obtain the same skills through other means. 
Our results advance the literature on the quality of leaders by being the first study to systematically analyze the link
between politicians education and competency in India. Moreover, it contributes to the broader literature on the political
economy of public provision of education in a democracy ( Bursztyn, 2016; Hill and Jones, 2017 ). The rest of the paper is
organized as follows. Section 2 provides a background by linking the current context with the existing literature and pro-
viding a conceptual framework for analysis. Section 3 describes how different data-sets have been collated for the purpose
of our analysis. The empirical model including the method used for identification is illustrated in Section 4 . In Section 5 , we
report the results of our analysis including various robustness tests and heterogeneity exercises. Section 6 discusses the po-
tential reasons why educated leaders have positive impact on education outcomes only in states with higher level of initial
development. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Background 
2.1. Identity of political leader 
Educated politicians may have a differential impact on education outcomes if the identity of the political leader matters
for policy making. In a world where candidates can fully commit to the implementation of a specific set of policies when
elected and care about getting reelected, politicians’ decisions would only reflect the preferences of the electorate ( Downs,
1957 ). In this setting, the characteristics of the individual person who wins elections will not matter. Thus, education level,
gender, religion, caste, involvement in criminal activities or other aspects of the identity of the politician would not affect
development outcomes. But citizen-candidate models ( Besley and Coate, 1997; Levitt, 1996; Osborne and Slivinski, 1996 )
suggest that complete commitment to policy is not possible and the identity of the politician has an influence on the
actual policies that are implemented. 6 In this model, voters take into account both policy preferences and other relevant
characteristics as competency when casting their votes. 
Empirical evidence also shows that identity of the politician matters for policies including government expenditure on
education ( Hill and Jones, 2017 ). Jones and Olken (2005) and Besley et al. (2011) use random leadership transitions at the
national level to show that individual characteristics of the leader matter for economic growth of the country. Extensive
literature on India has shown that gender, religion, caste and other characteristics of the political leader play an important
role in determining policy outcomes in the fields of education, health, economic growth and public infrastructure ( Asher and
Novosad, 2017; Bhalotra et al., 2014, 2017; Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras, 2014; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Clots-Figueras,
2011, 2012; Ghani et al., 2013; Halim et al., 2016; Iyer et al., 2012; O’Connell, 2018; Prakash et al., 2019; Burchi ). 
Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011) argue that good leaders might differ based on competency and prefer broad-based
policies and advocate public goods and infrastructure that generate wide benefits. They argue that educated leaders are
better citizens, have higher talent and higher concern for social welfare. Elementary education is a basic public good whose
widespread provision can lead to improvement in the welfare of citizens. If the arguments made by Besley and Reynal-
Querol (2011) or Atkinson et al. (2016) are valid, then educated politicians would prefer to invest their resources in education
due to its impact on long term welfare of citizens. Even if educated leaders do not prefer to invest in education, their higher
competency by itself should, on average, lead to better education outcomes. 
While acknowledging these arguments, Carnes and Lupu (2016) argue that the link between formal education, compe-
tence and leadership is not as straightforward. It is possible to gain human capital and skills required for being an effective
leader without formal education. Formal education does not just reflect human capital but also the privileges of being able
to obtain education. Societal restrictions and economic hardship might hinder a talented person from obtaining formal ed-
ucation while a less talented person might be able to obtain formal education. There still exists widespread discrimination,
though declining, in obtaining even elementary education by women and individuals from lower castes in India. 
Carnes and Lupu (2016) also argue that human capital obtained through formal education alone does not necessarily
improve the quality of leaders. Crucial factors like character, personality, ability to listen and understand people’s grievances
and other leadership qualities are not the focus of formal education and could be obtained without it. Even basic read-
ing and arithmetic skills could be obtained outside of formal schooling. In instances where specialized skills are required,
leaders could rely on qualified bureaucracy to help formulate solutions. Various studies have also shown that the most
qualified and those with the highest grades are not necessarily the most successful people in the society ( Gottesman
and Morey, 2006; Clotfelter et al., 2007 ). Several studies in the 1960s and 70s and recent followups by Carnes (2012,
2013) which examined the relationship between the education level of leaders and their attitudes, choices and decisions
when in office found no difference in behavior between more and less-educated politicians (see Carnes and Lupu (2016) for
details). 6 Also recent research has shown that politicians might not be always aware of citizens preferences ( Liaqat, 2019 ). 
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 The empirical evidence on the impact of education level of the leader on policies is thin and mixed. Dreher et al.
(2009) find that professional and highly educated leaders are more likely to implement market-liberalizing reforms. On the
other hand, Carnes and Lupu (2016) show that across contexts and the wide range of outcome indicators politicians with
a college degree perform the same or worse than non-college graduate politicians. Educated leaders at the national level
in a cross-country database, legislative leaders in the US and local municipal leaders in Brazil all perform no better than
non-educated leaders. This holds across a range of outcomes including economic growth, inequality, social unrest, interstate
conflict, unemployment, inflation, reelection, legislative productivity, and corruption. 
Except a few studies such as Martinez-Bravo (2017) , most of the studies that find a positive impact of education qual-
ification of the leader analyze data on leaders at the national level; but the impact of education of the leader might
be different at lower administrative levels. Leaders at the district or constituency level work more as “fixers” or lobby-
ists for their constituents and have a smaller role to play in broader policy making ( Chopra, 1996 ). Analyzing the activ-
ities of elected state constituency representatives across Indian states, Jensenius and Suryanarayan (2015) find that MLAs
spend more time in their constituencies rather than debating legislation in state assemblies. The time spent by leaders
debating legislation and making policies has also been declining over time – from 45 days per year in 1967 to about
34 days per year – and most legislation is passed without much debate. Politicians tend to spend most of their time
in their constituencies addressing their constituents’ complaints, attending social functions, being part of local govern-
ment bodies, helping individuals in accessing various government schemes, lobbying the district and state administra-
tion to implement their favored schemes and use their networks to attract investment to their constituency ( Chopra,
1996; Jensenius, 2015 ). Formal education might be helpful but is not essential to gain the skills required for this set of
tasks. 
2.2. MLAs and education policy 
India is a federal republic with parliamentary system of government at the state and the national level. Each state has a
legislative assembly (state government) which plays a substantial role in educational policies and expenditures, especially at
the primary and secondary level. For elections, states are divided into single-member constituencies in which candidates are
elected in first-past-the-post elections. The term of each elected state representative (MLA) is five years, unless the assembly
is dissolved before the end of its term. Constituencies within each state are drawn up so to ensure the same number
of people in each of them, though they vary in size across states. District is the administrative unit below the state and
consists of multiple constituencies, with a district having an average of nine constituencies. Education is on the concurrent
list in the Indian constitution where both the federal and state governments have jurisdiction, but state governments play a
major role in education policy at the primary and secondary level. 
MLAs can influence state education policy in various ways. First, MLAs can impact investment in school infrastructure
by lobbying for government funds for their constituencies and also by allocating own discretionary funding. They have
significant influence on the allocation of resources towards their own constituencies ( Bussell, 2019 ). They can lobby the
state government for funds to open new schools and help in accessing existing grants or programs for schools from state or
federal government. Also, they can direct funds to their districts’ educational office ( Singh and Cruz, 1997 ). 
Second, MLAs can play a significant role in management of bureaucracy and teachers. MLAs have control over the bureau-
cracy through role in promotions and job assignments or transfers ( Krishnan and Somanathan, 2013; Nath, 2015; Sukhtankar
and Vaishnav, 2015; Asher and Novosad, 2017 ). A study of teachers in nine states shows that teacher transfer in most states
are influenced either by official or unofficial role of local politicians ( Ramachandran et al., 2015 ). Fagernäs and Pelkonen
(2018) show that teacher hiring and management is influenced by political factors at the state level and it impacts students’
test scores. 
Third, MLAs can use their influence in impacting constituency and district level policy and monitoring of schemes. MLAs
are ex-offico members of constituency education committees and can impact education policy through this role. They can
impact state level policy by participating in debates and influencing other legislatures at the state level. 
Empirical evidence also links various characteristics of MLAs with differences in policy outcomes in various spheres
( Bhalotra et al., 2014, 2017; Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras, 2014; Prakash et al., 2019 ). Clots-Figueras (2012) shows that
districts with higher proportion of women MLAs have higher primary school completion rates than other districts. She
argues that women leaders prefer to invest in children’s education and are able to influence district policy outcomes.
If educated leaders are more competent then they can, if desired, presumably improve education outcomes for their
constituents. 
In this paper, we focus our analysis on determining whether educated political leaders have an impact on children’s
enrollment and learning outcomes. In addition, we analyze their impact on supply side factors such as number of schools,
schooling infrastructure and allocation of funds to schools. With the rapid expansion of elementary education in the last
decade, enrollment rates in primary schools have reached saturation levels ( > 95% enrollment rate across India), but learn-
ing outcomes among children have stayed low and declined in the recent period. According to Annual Status of Educa-
tion Report (ASER) only 40% of children in grade 3 can read a grade 1 level text and only 26% of children in grade
5 can do subtraction in 2014. These levels have declined from 49% and 43% respectively in 2007. Basic knowledge and
skills – rather than enrollment or years of schooling – are key to empower children to realize their potential in life
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 ( Pritchett, 2013 ). This has been recognized widely by non-government organizations (NGO) and state governments across the
country. 7 
Pratham, a large education NGO, which first highlighted these issues has implemented several initiatives to improve
learning outcomes since 2007. Pratham working in collaboration with state and local governments has organized short-
duration intensive learning camps to improve basic skills for over 430,0 0 0 children in 2014–15. Randomized evaluations
of learning outcome improvement programs implemented by Pratham in collaboration with local governments in states
of Bihar, Uttarakhand, Haryana, Gujarat and Maharashtra have found substantial improvements in reading and math skills
among children ( Banerjee et al., 2007; Banerji et al., 2013; Banerjee et al., 2010 ). These programs are simple, low-cost inter-
ventions that focus on teaching core competencies which are supposed to be taught in the first and second grades. Several
state governments have also implemented their own programs to improve reading and arithmetic skills. If educated political
leaders wish to improve learning outcomes or are more competent than other leaders, improving learning outcomes is not
a far-fetched goal with the resources they have at their disposal. 
2.3. Heterogeneity in Indian states and leader’s impact 
India is a diverse country and the economic, social and political factors vary substantially across the states and hence
we postulate that there might be heterogeneity in impact of leaders across states. The Human Development Index (HDI)
for Indian states varies from a high of 0.79 for Kerala to a low of 0.56 for Bihar. The highest HDI state would be ranked
63rd in the world if it was a country and the lowest HDI would be ranked 152nd – indicating the range of development
level within the country. The historical development of states and hence the nature of politics differs across states. Southern
states like Kerala and Tamil Nadu are among the high HDI states and have a history of active political participation by
citizens leading to demands of social provision of services including education. While some of the northern states like Bihar
and Uttar Pradesh are low HDI states and issues of caste and religion still dominate the political debate. Administrative
capacity and regulations vary substantively across the states in India. One example is that Tamil Nadu (a high HDI state) has
a rules-based software-driven teacher transfer process whereas Orissa (a low HDI state) has ad-hoc process ( Ramachandran
et al., 2015 ). 
There are several reasons one could expect heterogeneity in impact of educated leaders. The first potential reason is that
citizens may have higher preference for education in some states than others. This makes education a politically salient
item on which graduate leaders – being more competent than non-graduate leaders – may deliver better outcomes in these
states. In this context, graduate leaders may yield better education outcomes if: (a) they understand better that citizens
have higher demand for education, or (b) although both graduate and non-graduate leaders equally understand citizens’
preferences, yet graduate leaders achieve better education outcomes due to having higher competency. 
A second possible reason is that a minimum level of development may be required for the efforts of educated leaders
to be fruitful. In highly developed states the higher level of development may complement leaders’ input and make them
effective. On the contrary, due to a lower base it may be easier for leaders to improve outcomes in the less developed states.
Another possibility is that graduate leaders may design policies that target either the high performing or the low per-
forming students. Average learning levels of students in highly developed states tend to be better than those in less devel-
oped states. Therefore, policies that target only better learners may be effective in more developed states as they have larger
proportion of high-achieving students. On the other hand, if educated leaders design interventions to improve outcomes of
low-achievers, then on an average effects are more likely to show up in less developed states. 
It is also likely that the quality of a graduate degree varies across states, making graduate leaders better and more
effective in some states. Due to these various reasons, we test whether the impact of educated leaders varies depending
on the nature of the state. In particular, we use baseline HDI as a proxy for the level of development while exploring
heterogeneous effects. 8 
3. Data and summary statistics 
We create a data-set that combines information on politicians contesting in state assembly elections in India with various
education outcomes. 
3.1. Education data 
Education outcomes are from different data sources and both at the individual child and school level. The individual
child outcomes are learning outcomes for reading, mathematics and English, and enrollment outcomes from Annual Status
of Education Report (ASER). School quality outcomes are obtained from the annual census of schools - District Information
System for Education (DISE). We use multiple data sources as the range of outcomes are not present in any single data-set
and it also checks the robustness of our results to source of data. 7 The central government in its 2017 budget acknowledging the importance of learning outcomes has decided to make quality assessment a central plank 
in its elementary education policy. 
8 In Section 4 , we explain in more details how we categorize states. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics from child level data. 
6–10 age-group 11–16 age-group 
Obs. Mean SD Obs. Mean SD 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
All States 
Reading score 12,19,804 −0.020 1.010 12,31,335 −0.010 1.005 
Math score 12,09,304 −0.032 0.979 12,26,732 −0.046 1.001 
English score 5,37,602 −0.001 1.007 5,46,275 −0.020 1.002 
Enrollment 13,03,387 0.979 0.144 13,90,843 0.920 0.272 
Age of child 13,41,118 8.099 1.435 13,92,458 13.338 1.633 
Child is female 13,41,118 0.466 0.499 13,92,458 0.472 0.499 
Child’s mother went to school 13,41,118 0.530 0.499 13,92,458 0.489 0.500 
Low HDI States 
Reading score 5,84,281 −0.203 1.046 5,48,831 −0.164 1.147 
Math score 5,77,014 −0.220 1.020 5,46,100 −0.197 1.104 
English score 2,67,843 −0.254 0.942 2,51,618 −0.275 1.084 
Enrollment 6,26,691 0.970 0.171 6,26,912 0.895 0.307 
Age of child 6,47,290 8.089 1.444 6,27,875 13.335 1.622 
Child is female 6,47,290 0.461 0.498 6,27,875 0.465 0.499 
Child’s mother went to school 6,47,290 0.399 0.490 6,27,875 0.371 0.483 
Medium HDI States 
Reading score 3,31,969 0.048 0.957 3,38,146 0.011 0.947 
Math score 3,30,036 0.051 0.915 3,37,098 −0.039 0.945 
English score 1,31,955 0.207 1.011 1,38,497 0.099 0.925 
Enrollment 3,61,551 0.982 0.134 3,93,731 0.915 0.279 
Age of child 3,72,166 8.081 1.429 3,94,086 13.343 1.639 
Child is female 3,72,166 0.473 0.499 3,94,086 0.479 0.500 
Child’s mother went to school 3,72,166 0.577 0.494 3,94,086 0.514 0.500 
High HDI States 
Reading score 3,03,554 0.258 0.920 3,44,358 0.216 0.739 
Math score 3,02,254 0.236 0.886 3,43,534 0.188 0.822 
English score 1,37,804 0.291 0.999 1,56,160 0.287 0.806 
Enrollment 3,15,145 0.993 0.082 3,70,200 0.966 0.181 
Age of child 3,21,662 8.140 1.422 3,70,497 13.338 1.645 
Child is female 3,21,662 0.467 0.499 3,70,497 0.476 0.499 
Child’s mother went to school 3,21,662 0.738 0.440 3,70,497 0.664 0.472 
Source: Author’s calculation using ASER data. The unit of observation is children of different age groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3.1.1. ASER data 
ASER, an annual district representative survey, documents children’s schooling status and basic learning levels in all
rural districts in India. The survey has been conducted every year from 2005 to 2014 by a group of over 30,0 0 0 trained
volunteers from over 700 partner organizations under the leadership of Pratham. The survey is conducted from September
to November, and covers a random sample of 20 households in 30 villages in each of India’s rural districts (approximately
550) totaling about 30 0,0 0 0 households across the country each year and approximately 60 0,0 0 0 children in the age group
of 3–16. 
ASER tests all children in the household between the ages of 5 and 16 for basic arithmetic and basic reading proficiency
in the vernacular language using rigorously developed testing tools. 9 The same test is given to all children across the years.
The reading assessment has four levels: letters, words, a short paragraph (a grade 1 level text), and a short story (a grade 2
level text). Similarly, the arithmetic assessment consists of four levels: single-digit number recognition, double-digit number
recognition, two-digit subtraction with carry over, and three digit by one digit division (corresponding to what students are
expected to know in grade 3 or 4). These levels are converted into a continuous scale of 0–4 in our main analysis. The
highest level for which children are comfortable is marked. In the years 20 07, 20 09, 2012 and 2014, children were also
tested for their competency in basic English. 
We use data for the years 2006 to 2014 on enrollment and learning outcomes of children belonging to 6–16 years of age.
We divide our sample into two groups – children aged 6–10 years which corresponds to primary school age (grade 1–5) in
India and children aged 11–16 years corresponding to middle and secondary school age (grade 6 and above) to study the
impact of educated politicians on their learning outcomes. Overall our sample includes more than 1.29 million children in
each age-group. Table 1 presents summary statistics for our estimation sample. 9 The tools are available at http://www.asercentre.org/p/141.html . 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics from school level data. 
Mean SD Obs. 
(1) (2) (3) 
All States 
Total number of schools 2303 1519 2850 
Average school grant (Rs.) 18,187 13,134 2817 
Prop. schools with girls toilet 0.88 0.16 2850 
Prop. schools with boys toilet 0.76 0.27 2850 
Prop. schools with electricity 0.54 0.36 2850 
Prop. schools with water 0.96 0.11 2850 
Prop. schools with computers 0.27 0.24 2850 
Prop. schools with Pupil Teacher Ratio > 30 0.28 0.22 2850 
Low HDI States 
Total number of schools 2659 1171 1082 
Average school grant (Rs.) 14997 10,752 1081 
Prop. schools with girls toilet 0.85 0.16 1082 
Prop. schools with boys toilet 0.74 0.28 1082 
Prop. schools with electricity 0.26 0.18 1082 
Prop. schools with water 0.97 0.06 1082 
Prop. schools with computers 0.09 0.06 1082 
Prop. schools with Pupil Teacher Ratio > 30 0.43 0.24 1082 
Medium HDI States 
Total number of schools 2414 1907 1003 
Average school grant (Rs.) 19,065 13,112 996 
Prop. schools with girls toilet 0.87 0.16 1003 
Prop. schools with boys toilet 0.72 0.28 1003 
Prop. schools with electricity 0.57 0.32 1003 
Prop. schools with water 0.93 0.13 1003 
Prop. schools with computers 0.28 0.20 1003 
Prop. schools with Pupil Teacher Ratio > 30 0.21 0.15 1003 
High HDI States 
Total number of schools 1653 1127 765 
Average school grant (Rs.) 21,664 15,128 740 
Prop. schools with girls toilet 0.95 0.12 765 
Prop. schools with boys toilet 0.83 0.21 765 
Prop. schools with electricity 0.88 0.25 765 
Prop. schools with water 1.01 0.10 765 
Prop. schools with computers 0.51 0.23 765 
Prop. schools with Pupil Teacher Ratio > 30 0.18 0.13 765 
Source: Author’s calculation using DISE data. The unit of observation is the dis- 
trict. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3.1.2. DISE data 
DISE is a database on all recognized schools in India with information on school infrastructure, funding, enrollment,
teachers and other aspects of schools maintained by the Government of India. This is updated annually and cross-validated.
DISE has data on over 1 million schools across India for each year, and is the most comprehensive source of data on schools
in India. We use data from 2006 to 2014 for the number of schools, and from 2010 to 2014 on school infrastructure and
funding outcomes. We aggregate this data on various outcomes of interest at the district level. Table 2 presents the summary
statistics from DISE data. The first outcome is the total number of schools present in the district. We use Principal compo-
nent analysis (PCA) to generate an index of school infrastructure and use it as one of the outcome variables. The index is the
first component of the PCA generated using data on whether the school has free textbooks, furniture, girl’s toilet, electricity
connection, access to safe drinking water, library, playground and computers. The index is our second outcome measure. The
third outcome variable is the average grants received by schools in the district in each year. There is substantial variation in
all outcome variables across the districts. 
3.2. Political data 
A data-set on politicians contesting state assembly elections in India between 2004 and 2014 was constructed using
information obtained from the Election Commission of India (ECI) and the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR). The
ECI provides data on the number of votes, gender and party affiliation of all candidates contesting in every state assembly
election in India. Following a 2003 Supreme Court judgment all individuals contesting elections have to file an affidavit
with the election commission listing their education level, assets, and criminal cases among other details. The Association
for Democratic Reforms (ADR) has scanned all these affidavits and provided the information online for central and state
elections from 2004 onwards. We combined this information from ECI and ADR to construct a detailed portrait of all winner
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Table 3 
Summary statistics of district level variables from elections data. 
Variables 
Obs. Mean SD 
(1) (2) (3) 
Proportion of seats won by graduates 1,127 0.594 0.251 
District with at least one graduate leader 1,127 0.953 0.212 
Proportion of seats won by graduates in close elections against non-graduates 1,127 0.039 0.098 
District with at least one graduate leader who won in close election against non-graduate 1,127 0.201 0.401 
Proportion of seats with close election between graduate and non-graduate 1,127 0.0814 0.138 
District with at least one close election between graduate and non-graduate 1,127 0.378 0.485 
Proportion of seats with election between graduate and non-graduate 1,127 0.407 0.249 
District with at least one election between graduate and non-graduate 1,127 0.876 0.330 
Notes: The unit of observation is district in an electoral year. The sample corresponds to the full sample used in child level re- 
gressions. Close election is the one where the winner beat the runner up by less than 3% of votes. Source: Authors’ calculation 
from ADR and ECI data combined. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 and runner-up candidates for state assembly elections from 2004 to 2014. Among winner and runner-up candidates about
39% have not completed college education (Table A1 in the online appendix). Table 3 presents summary statistics from the
electoral data. About 38% of districts have at least one close election between graduate and a non-graduate and almost equal
number of close elections are won by each type of candidates (49% and 51% respectively). 
3.3. Merged data 
ASER rounds provide information on residence of a child only at the district level whereas political leaders are elected
at the constituency level, which is below the district level. To merge the education and political data-sets we aggregated
the election data at the district level. For each child in the sample, politicians who were in power in the year when the
child’s enrollment and learning levels were recorded and the two years prior to it are identified. Similar merging is also
done with the DISE data at the district level. ADR has data on candidate’s education level only for state elections conducted
after 2004, when the law requiring candidates to publicly report their education level came into force. Since the elections
for state assemblies in different states are conducted in different years, the starting year of our data differs for each state –
the first election year after 2004 for that state. 10 
4. Empirical strategy 
In this section we lay out an econometric model to identify the causal effect of having a graduate versus a non-graduate
leader on the educational outcomes of children. As explained in the previous section, the data on leaders’ education can be
merged with the data on outcome variables only at the district level. Therefore our treatment variable is defined for each
district, as the fraction of constituencies with a graduate leader in the district. When the outcome is measured at the child
level using ASER data (learning outcomes, enrollment), then our unit of analysis is a child; on the other hand, when we
use DISE data on schools, the outcomes are measured at the district level (number of schools, average school infrastructure,
average grants etc.) and hence district itself is the unit of analysis. However, in both these cases, the treatment variable is
defined at the district level for a given year. The following equation illustrates our basic specification which is estimated by
the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method: 
Y idst = αds + ηst + βG dst + γX idst + ε idst (1) 
The education outcome of child i living in district d of state s in year t is given by Y idst , and G dst is the fraction of
assembly constituency seats in the district held by a graduate politician during the last three years. 11 State and district
specific time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account by including district fixed effects αds . Since districts
are nested within states, therefore the district fixed effects also subsume the state fixed effects. There is a great deal of
heterogeneity across Indian state economies which are likely to follow very different trajectories of development. Therefore,
we control for all time varying state level factors by including state specific year fixed effects ( ηst ) which also subsumes the
overall year fixed effects capturing the impact of growth and various educational policies at the national level. Child level10 For example, for Maharashtra which had elections in 2004 we have data on politicians’ education level for all years from 2004 to 2014, but for Gujarat 
our data starts only in 2008 which is the first election year in Gujarat after 2004. Since we are using average value of three years for all political variables 
in our base specification, the data on outcome variables used in the estimation for a state start two years after the beginning of election data for that 
state. For example, for all districts in Maharashtra our base specification uses ASER data starting from 2006 whereas for districts in Gujarat estimation data 
start only in 2010. To elucidate further, our base model assumes that a child living in rural areas of Jalna district of Maharashtra surveyed in 2007 will be 
impacted by politicians elected in the district from 2005 to 2007. 
11 Following Clots-Figueras (2012) , the main specification considers the average fraction of seats held by a graduate politician over the past two years and 
the current year. In the robustness section, we consider alternative lag periods to calculate this variable, and our results are qualitatively similar in those 
specifications and are discussed later. 
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 covariates which are included in the vector X idst are gender and age-cohort specific dummy variables, and an indicator of
whether child’s mother attended school. 
The main challenge of identifying β from Eq. 1 is the possibility that some omitted variables which vary across districts
and over time, may be correlated with both G dst and Y idst . While the district fixed effects take care of inherent differences
that do not change over time, the presence of time varying unobservable effects at the district level cannot be ruled out.
For instance, in regions that have experienced higher growth of educated individuals, voters’ preference for education may
be manifested through higher propensity to elect graduate politicians in recent elections than in past elections. The fraction
of seats held by graduate leaders may be endogenously determined due to the presence of such unobservable factors. 
Identification 
To tackle the endogeneity problem, we use the fraction of seats won by graduate politicians in close elections between
a graduate and a non-graduate politician ( GC dst ) as an instrument for the overall fraction of seats held by graduate leaders
( G dst ). Close elections are defined as those where the margin of victory is small. For the main specification, we consider
an election to be close when the winner beats the runner-up by less than 3% of total votes, and measure the instrument
accordingly. 12 Insofar as the vote difference between the top two candidates in an election is arbitrarily small, the winner
will be determined by chance; hence the use of close election provides a plausible basis for constructing the instrument in
this context. We provide further discussion on the validity of the instrument in a subsequent section. 
This empirical strategy has been used in the literature to identify the impact of other personal characteristics of leaders
(e.g. gender, religion) on various development outcomes ( Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras, 2014; Bhalotra et al., 2014; Clots-
Figueras, 2011; 2012 ). Identification in this method relies on the quasi-randomness of the outcome of a close election. The
fraction of constituencies in the district won by a graduate leader in a close election against a non-graduate leader is used
as an instrument for the fraction of constituencies won in the district by a graduate leader. The instrument is valid because
graduate leaders who win by a small margin do so in constituencies where there is no clear preference for graduate leaders
and the non-graduate leader could have also won. The graduate leader winning is almost by chance in these close elections.
The constituencies which elect a graduate leader versus those which elect a non-graduate leader are similar in all character-
istics except the education level of the leader. The election of the graduate leader in these close elections can be considered
essentially random. Given the outcome of each election can be considered random, the average of these electoral outcomes
can be considered random as well. 
The model is estimated through a two-stage least squares (2SLS) method and is given below: 
Y idst = αds + ηst + βG dst + λT C dst + 
N ∑ 
j=1 
π j I j d st × F (M j d st ) + 
N ∑ 
j=1 
μ j I j d st + X idst γ + 	idst (2)
G dst = ω ds + τst + θGC dst + ρT C dst + 
N ∑ 
j=1 
φ j I j d st × F (M j d st ) + 
N ∑ 
j=1 
ψ j I j d st + X idst ξ + e idst (3)
Eq. 2 is the second stage and Eq. 3 is the first stage. The main explanatory variable G dst which is potentially endogenous,
is instrumented by the proportion of educated leaders who win in close elections against a non-graduate candidate GC dst .
Note that unlike the outcome of a close election, the existence of close election may not be random: it may depend on the
number of educated candidates or the prevailing political competitiveness in the district. Therefore we control for the frac-
tion of seats that had close elections between graduate and non-graduate candidates in the district ( TC dst ). This also captures
any direct effect of having close elections, such as greater effectiveness of leaders due to higher political competitiveness
in the region. The exclusion restriction for the instruments is also satisfied by controlling for the fraction of seats that had
close elections. 
The Indian electoral system follows the first-past-the-post voting system where the candidate who gets more votes than
any other candidate wins the election. Between the top two candidates, the probability that a candidate will win is a func-
tion of the margin of votes between the candidate and his/her contestant, and this probability changes discontinuously at
the point where the margin of votes is zero. Considering those elections where the contest takes place between a graduate
and a non-graduate politician, in an arbitrarily small neighborhood around this point of discontinuity, this discontinuity at
zero margin of votes is essentially similar to random assignment of treatment. Since the main explanatory variable is at the
district level, we aggregate over the constituency specific discontinuities in treatment assignment within the district; thus
we have a research design in the spirit of a fuzzy regression discontinuity design in our empirical set up. 13 12 The margin of victory is defined as the difference in the share of votes between the winner and the runner-up, where the total turnout is used as the 
denominator to calculate the vote shares. In the robustness section, we use various other levels of margin of victory to define close elections between a 
graduate and a non-graduate candidate. 
13 We also attempted to estimate a sharp RDD model by considering only those districts where there was only one election where a graduate candidate 
contested against a non-graduate candidate. However, since graduate degree is about the median level of education of leaders, therefore, majority of the 
districts have more than one election where the contest took place between a graduate and a non-graduate. Thus, we do not have enough number of 
districts to credibly estimate a sharp RDD model. 
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Table 4 
First stage of the 2SLS estimates of the effect on children’s reading score. 
Fraction of seats won by a graduate 
6–10 age-group 11–16 age-group 
All States Low HDI Medium HDI High HDI All States Low HDI Medium HDI High HDI 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fraction of seats won by 1.054 ∗∗∗ 1.062 ∗∗∗ 0.799 ∗∗∗ 1.308 ∗∗∗ 1.041 ∗∗∗ 1.046 ∗∗∗ 0.803 ∗∗∗ 1.243 ∗∗∗
a graduate in close elections (0.153) (0.188) (0.164) (0.238) (0.141) (0.178) (0.161) (0.230) 
Observations 1,219,804 584,281 331,969 303,554 1,231,335 548,831 338,146 344,358 
R-squared 0.352 0.395 0.513 0.450 0.355 0.396 0.534 0.436 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. Close elections are defined as election between a graduate and a 
non-graduate in which the difference in vote share between the winner and the runner up is less than 3% ˙All regressions control for proportion 
of seats that had close election in district, vote margin (linear), child’s age-dummies, gender, mother’s education, district fixed effects, year fixed 
effects, and state specific year fixed effects. ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1% level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The specification also controls for a polynomial in the victory margins (linear in the base specification) of every graduate
versus non-graduate election (close or non-close) in the district. The margin of victory between a graduate and a non-
graduate candidate in election j is M jdst . The polynomials, denoted by F ( M jdst ), are interacted with I jdst which indicates the
existence of an election between a graduate versus non-graduate politician j in the district during the period considered. We
also test if the results are robust to varying degrees of the polynomial function. Our model is based closely on model used
in various other studies, e.g. the impact of women leaders on health and education outcomes by Clots-Figueras (2012) and
Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras (2014) . The rest of the variables included in the 2SLS analysis are same as in the OLS regres-
sion. The standard errors are clustered at the district level to allow for any possible correlation in the error terms among
observations from the same district. 
To investigate the potential differential impact across Indian states, we split the sample into three groups of states based
on their 2004–05 Human Development Index (HDI) scores and run the same model separately for each of them. 14 The high-
HDI states also have the highest per-pupil education expenditure and have the best school funding and infrastructure, while
the low-HDI states have the least per-pupil education expenditure and the lowest level of school funding and infrastructure.
We present the analysis that explores this heterogeneity in the initial condition of the states, and discuss the plausible
explanations for our results in a later section. Prakash et al., 2019 also investigate the impact of electing a criminally accused
politician by state characteristics. They find the the negative impact varies by state characteristics. The economic costs are
concentrated in poor and corrupt states – a category that overlaps substantially with the low-HDI states category we are
analyzing. 
5. Results 
In this section, we present the estimates of the impact of educated politicians on our main outcome variables capturing
children’s education, and further explore the effect on school outcomes as channels. The dependent variables for learning
levels measure children’s cognitive outcomes in terms of the standardized reading, mathematics and English scores. 15 The
main explanatory variable of interest is the fraction of seats in the district held by the educated leaders. 
5.1. Validity of identification strategy 
Before discussing the main results, we show the validity of the instrument and of the regression discontinuity design by
running various tests. 
5.1.1. Validity of instrument 
We test whether the instrument is a good predictor of the endogenous variable in the first stage of the 2SLS estimation.
Table 4 presents the first stage regressions for 6–10 and 11–16 age-groups for reading scores. The coefficient of the instru-
mental variable, i.e. fraction of seats won by a graduate leader in close elections, is found to be statistically significant at
1% level in all specifications and for both the age-groups. Result for the sample of 6–10 age-group shows that holding the14 Population weights are used to classify the states based on HDI. Low human development states are Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, 
Odisha and Uttar Pradesh. Medium human development states are Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Manipur, Meghalaya, Na- 
galand, Rajasthan,Sikkim,Tripura,West Bengal and Uttarakhand. High human development states are Delhi, Goa, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Jammu 
& Kashmir, Maharashtra, Mizoram, Puducherry, Punjab and Tamil Nadu. Alternatively, we also ran our models with groupings based on state level income 
(State Domestic Product) and obtain qualitatively similar results (available on request). 
15 We use age-wise standardized test scores as a measure of the cognitive outcome. For any given age, between 6–16, we consider children of that age 
from all the survey years, and calculate the mean and standard deviation of their test scores in a specific subject, and thus calculate the z-score for that 
subject. The implication of using these standardized test scores (z-scores) as outcomes is that the magnitude of the effect from the regression can be 
interpreted in terms of standard deviation in test scores. 
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Table 5 
2SLS estimates of the effect on children’s education outcomes. 
6–10 age-group 11–16 age-group 
State HDI category State HDI category 
All Low Medium High All Low Medium High 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Reading score 
Fraction of seats −0.004 −0.142 0.262 0.324 ∗∗ −0.011 −0.135 0.246 0.208 ∗
won by a graduate (0.104) (0.152) (0.299) (0.153) (0.085) (0.125) (0.230) (0.124) 
Observations 1,219,804 584,281 331,969 303,554 1,231,335 548,831 338,146 344,358 
First Stage F-stat 48 32 24 30 55 35 25 29 
Mathematics score 
Fraction of seats −0.073 −0.200 0.099 0.331 ∗∗ −0.063 −0.236 0.179 0.260 ∗
won by a graduate (0.122) (0.178) (0.331) (0.162) (0.122) (0.180) (0.346) (0.154) 
Observations 1,209,304 577,014 330,036 302,254 1,226,732 546,100 337,098 343,534 
First Stage F-stat 48 32 24 30 55 35 25 29 
English score 
Fraction of seats 0.031 −0.164 -0.010 0.630 ∗∗ 0.007 −0.196 −0.304 0.447 ∗∗
won by a graduate (0.131) (0.155) (0.271) (0.293) (0.123) (0.177) (0.298) (0.190) 
Observations 537,602 267,843 131,955 137,804 546,275 251,618 138,497 156,160 
First Stage F-stat 56 33 29 31 63 37 28 30 
Enrollment 
Fraction of seats −0.014 −0.031 ∗∗ −0.015 0.010 ∗ −0.016 −0.039 ∗ −0.090 0.014 
won by a graduate (0.011) (0.015) (0.018) (0.006) (0.015) (0.020) (0.065) (0.014) 
Observations 1,303,387 626,691 361,551 315,145 1,390,843 626,912 393,731 370,200 
First Stage F-stat 45 31 23 30 54 34 25 29 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. Close elections are defined as election be- 
tween a graduate and a non-graduate in which the difference in vote share between the winner and the runner up is 
less than 3%. All regressions control for proportion of seats that had close election in district, vote margin (linear), child’s 
age-dummies, gender, mother’s education, district fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state specific year fixed effects. ∗∗∗
Significant at the 1% level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5% level. ∗ Significant at the 10% level. 
Fig. 1. First stage illustration: Sample consisting of all elections between graduate and non-graduate candidates. Notes: District-level fraction of graduate 
MLAs is plotted against the vote margin between graduate and non-graduate candidates in each constituency of the district. Data from 2004–2014 are 
aggregated into 1 percentage point bins. The curves are local polynomial regressions (with 95 percent confidence intervals on each side) fitted separately 
for positive and negative parts of the margin of victory variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 fraction of constituencies with close election constant, a 10 percentage point increase in the fraction of constituencies where
a graduate leader won against a non-graduate leader in a close election leads to 8 to 13 percentage point increase in the
overall fraction of seats held by the graduate leaders in the district, depending on the sample. The results are similar for the
first stage analysis using DISE data (Table A2). Although the coefficient of the instrumental variable is not exactly 1, it is not
significantly different from 1 in any of the samples. Some graduate politicians win in elections that are not close elections
against non-graduate politicians, e.g. they may win by a large margin or against another graduate candidate, affecting the
overall proportion of graduate leaders in the district. 
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 We also provide a graphical illustration to explain the first stage relationship. In Fig. 1 we plot the district-level fraction of
graduate MLAs against the vote margin between graduate and non-graduate candidates in each constituency of the district. 16 
The figure shows that a graduate politician winning a close election leads to a significant and discontinuous rise in the
fraction of constituencies in the district won by graduate politicians. 
5.1.2. Validity of close election related assumptions 
We conduct several checks to show the validity of our assumption that results in close elections are quasi-random. In
summary statistics, we see that the probability of winning a close election is same for graduate and non-graduate candi-
dates. But some recent studies have questioned the validity of the close election premise by showing that incumbency status
and previous vote share are strongly correlated with winning close elections in the United States House elections, pointing
to the possibility of manipulation ( Caughey and Sekhon, 2011; Grimmer et al., 2011 ). However Eggers et al. (2015) find
that such sorting in close elections is unique to U.S. House elections in the post-war period and does not hold forth in
other countries including India. Along these lines, we test for differences in various constituency and candidate character-
istics in close elections. Table A3 shows that these are not significantly different across close elections where graduate or
non-graduate candidates win. 
We must also obviate the concern that the effect of graduate leaders may be picking up differences in other character-
istics between graduate and non-graduate leaders. For example, if graduate leaders are more likely to be younger and male
than non-graduate leaders, then the challenge is to identify the effect caused by the difference in their education status,
rather than their age and gender. In our RD set up, this threat to identification would be valid if graduate leaders who win
in close elections were significantly different from non-graduate leaders along the dimensions other than their education
level. From Table A3 we find that there is no significant difference in terms of gender, age, criminal status, and other observ-
able characteristics between graduate winners and non-graduate winners in close elections. We further investigate whether
other characteristics are continuous around the cut-off in the vote margin between graduate and non-graduate candidates.
Figure 2 provides graphical evidence that indeed other factors such as the leader’s age, gender, criminal status, wealth, party
affiliation, the proportion of reserved constituencies in the district, the electorate size and turnout in the election do not
change significantly around the cut-off. Hence this exercise indicates that only the education status of the politician changes
discontinuously at the zero-margin of victory, implying that our analysis identifies the causal effect of graduate versus non-
graduate leaders on the outcomes of interest. 
Moreover, we test for the possibility that the outcome of a close election is biased in favor of the incumbent or a party
that has strategic influence over the election process. In particular, we consider whether the graduate candidate wins in
a close election between graduate and non-graduate candidates, and regress this outcome on the party affiliation of the
contestants along with other constituency and district level characteristics (Table A4). We find that the outcome of a close
election is not significantly predicted by almost any of the variables related to political parties and the predictors are also
jointly not significant. 
The RD design assumptions might be violated if there is vote manipulation leading to bias in the outcome of a close
election. To verify that there is no manipulation involved we check if the distribution of the vote margin is continuous
around the neighborhood of zero. We plot the density of the vote margin ( Fig. 3 ) and test if the difference in the densities
on either side of the zero point is significant ( McCrary, 2008 ). The estimated difference is −0.099 and is statistically not
significant. The election commission of India which conducts elections in India is known to be independent and politically
neutral and elections are considered free and fair. 
In addition, to satisfy the RD assumptions one must show that districts where more graduates win in close elections
are not systematically different than where more non-graduates win. In Table A5 we compare various characteristics in the
two types of districts. The districts with more graduate winners do not differ significantly in any of the characteristics from
districts with more non-graduate winners in close elections. 
We have shown that several of the RD assumptions are valid for our data, but our estimates might still not have exter-
nal validity. Though we cannot prove this conclusively, we do provide some indications that our results have considerable
external validity. 
First, we show that the identity of constituencies and districts that have close elections between graduate and non-
graduates changes substantially over the elections. The average change in the proportion of a district’s constituencies that
experience close elections over multiple elections is 71% T˙his indicates that we are not picking up some feature of districts
that have close elections and points to external validity. Also the percentage of graduate winners in close elections within
a district changes by 61% over election cycles, indicating little correlation between graduates winning close elections and
district characteristics. 
We repeat the identification validity tests described in this section for each of the three categories of states by develop-
ment level and get qualitatively similar results. All these results are provided in the appendix. 16 Data from 2004–2014 are aggregated into 1 percentage point bins. Local polynomial regressions are fitted separately for positive and negative parts of 
the margin of victory variable. 
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Fig. 2. Continuity checks for other characteristics of candidates and constituencies. Notes: The horizontal axis plots the difference in vote share between 
graduate and non-graduate candidates in different elections. The vertical axis plots the district level average age of the constituency leaders, the fraction of 
seats won by female politicians, fraction of seats won by criminally-accused politicians, fraction of constituencies reserved for backward sections (Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes), log of average asset of winner, fraction of seats won by politicians affiliated to state ruling party, log of electorate size, and 
turnout (poll percentage). Data from 2004–2014 are aggregated into 1 percentage point bins. The curves are local polynomial regressions (with 95 percent 
confidence intervals on each side) fitted separately for positive and negative parts of the margin of victory variable. 
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Fig. 3. Continuity of vote margin between graduate and non-graduate candidates (running variable). Notes: The upper panel shows the kernel density of 
vote margin between graduate and non-graduate candidates. The lower panel shows McCrarys density test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5.2. Child level outcomes 
We find that there is heterogeneous impact of educated leaders on children’s learning outcomes. Column 1 and 5 in
Table 5 presents results for the entire country, while columns 2–4 and 6–8 present results for grouping of states based on
the Human Development Index (HDI). 17 All regressions control for the proportion of seats that had close elections in the
district, vote margin (linear), childs age-dummies, gender, mothers education, district fixed effects, year fixed effects, and
state-specific year fixed effects. The impact of graduate leaders is positive and significant only in the most developed states.
But there is no statistically significant effect of having a higher proportion of graduate leaders in the districts on children’s
learning scores or enrollment for the entire country or in low and medium developed states. The point estimates in the
latter case also suggest that the magnitude of effect is low. 18 
In the most developed states, the magnitude of the coefficient implies that increasing the number of graduate leaders
in the district by 10 percentage points, i.e. having an additional leader being graduate in the district, results in an increase
of 0.032 standard deviation (SD) in the reading score of children in 6–10 years age-group. This effect is equivalent to an
increase of 0.04 points in the raw reading score, or 1.7% of the sample mean of reading score for these children (Table
A8). The corresponding impact on math score is similar at 0.033 SD or 1.7% of the mean score. The effect size for English
score is higher at 0.063 SD or 4% of the mean score. For children in 11–16 age-group, the effects are statistically significant
but slightly lower in magnitude, as they vary from 0.6% to 1.6% of the mean scores across different learning outcomes.
To put our results into perspective, we compare these effect sizes with other papers using ASER data. Shah and Steinberg
(2017) find that a drought in the district, as compared to normal rainfall, reduces the opportunity cost of education and
hence increases math score of children by 0.02 SD or 0.75% of the mean score. Thus, the effect size found in their study is
comparable (if not smaller) with the effect of educated leaders we have estimated here. However, the impact of educated
leaders seems far smaller when we compare it with the effect of a school feeding program on learning outcomes. Using
ASER data, Chakraborty and Jayaraman (2019) find that a child exposed to midday meal throughout primary schooling (five
years) has learning scores that are higher by 0.09–0.17 SD (9–18%) than those with less than one year of exposure. 
The variables measuring learning outcomes are not continuous, but ordinal with different levels. To better understand at
which levels of learning the impacts are higher, we use binary variables indicating the level of learning as an alternative
dependent variable. 19 Linear probability models are estimated using 2SLS method following the same specification as the17 The OLS estimates are presented in Table A6. 
18 The reduced form estimates of Eqs. 2 and 3 are presented in Table A7. Comparing with the 2SLS estimates, similar conclusions can be drawn from the 
reduced form results. 
19 For reading, these variables reflect whether a child can read letters, words, short paragraph and short stories. For mathematics, each of them measure 
one of the categories from single-digit number recognition, double-digit number recognition, two-digit subtraction with carry over, and three digit by one 
digit division. For English, they measure the ability to recognize capital letter, small letter, word, and sentence. 
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Table 6 
Robustness: binary indicators for different levels of learning as outcome variable (High HDI states). 
Level of reading skill 
6–10 age-group 11–16 age-group 
Letter Word Paragraph Story Letter Word Paragraph Story 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fraction of seats won 0.054 ∗ 0.089 ∗ 0.123 ∗ 0.136 ∗∗ 0.021 ∗∗ 0.035 ∗ 0.061 0.092 
by a graduate (0.031) (0.053) (0.067) (0.055) (0.010) (0.020) (0.041) (0.062) 
Observations 303,554 303,554 303,554 303,554 344,358 344,358 344,358 344,358 
First Stage F-stat 30.23 30.23 30.23 30.23 29.18 29.18 29.18 29.18 
Mean of outcome variable 0.86 0.69 0.47 0.28 0.92 0.90 0.85 0.74 
Level of math skill 
6–10 age-group 11–16 age-group 
1 digit 2 digit Subtraction Division 1 digit 2 digit Subtraction Division 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fraction of seats won 0.048 ∗ 0.121 ∗ 0.141 ∗∗ 0.062 ∗ 0.014 0.037 ∗ 0.089 0.134 
by a graduate (0.029) (0.065) (0.070) (0.037) (0.010) (0.022) (0.065) (0.082) 
Observations 302,254 302,254 302,254 302,254 343,534 343,534 343,534 343,534 
First Stage F-stat 30.26 30.26 30.26 30.26 29.15 29.15 29.15 29.15 
Mean of outcome variable 0.87 0.69 0.38 0.14 0.92 0.89 0.77 0.55 
Level of English skill 
6–10 age-group 11–16 age-group 
Capital letter Small letter Word Sentence Capital letter Small letter Word Sentence 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fraction of seats won 0.180 ∗∗ 0.259 ∗∗ 0.244 ∗∗ 0.142 ∗∗ 0.016 0.116 ∗∗ 0.150 ∗∗ 0.273 ∗∗∗
by a graduate (0.079) (0.130) (0.118) (0.071) (0.019) (0.057) (0.072) (0.102) 
Observations 137,804 137,804 137,804 137,804 156,160 156,160 156,160 156,160 
First Stage F-stat 30.58 30.58 30.58 30.58 30.47 30.47 30.47 30.47 
Mean of outcome variable 0.81 0.64 0.43 0.19 0.97 0.92 0.83 0.62 
Note: The regressions are linear probability models including the full set of controls as reported in Table 5 . Robust standard errors clustered at the district 
level are in parentheses. ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1% level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5% level. ∗ Significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 main regressions presented above. 20 The results indicate that the impact of educated leaders increases in magnitude as
the level of learning outcomes goes higher ( Table 6 ). The increase in the number of children in 6–10 age-group who are
at the highest level of reading (paragraph), mathematics (division) and English (sentence) outcomes is 4.9%, 4.4% and 7.5%
respectively due to a 10 percentage points increase in the number of educated leaders in the district. The impact on the
lower levels is less and for the lowest level it is less than one percent in most cases. In the 11–16 age-group category, we
do not find statistically significant effects at the higher levels of reading and math scores. For lower levels of learning, the
effects are statistically significant although the magnitudes are quite small. The number of children who can read an English
sentence in the 11–16 age group increases by 4.4% if there is one more educated leader in the district. 
For enrollment, the impact is small and statistically significant only in some instances. An additional educated leader
has a negative impact in least developed states for both age groups and positive impact in most developed states for the
6–10 age group. But the size of the impact is small. An additional educated leader in the district of a least developed state
reduces the probability of enrollment by 0.3–0.4 percentage points, while in the most developed states it increases the
probability of enrollment by 0.1 percentage point among children aged 6–10 years. The small size of impact is plausible
because enrollment rates are already at saturation levels (98% for 6–10 age group and 92% for the 11–16 age group) across
all states. 
We also test if the impact of graduate politicians is heterogeneous by gender of the child. We find that the size of the
impact is similar for both boys and girls for the 6–10 age group across outcomes. For the 11–16 age group, boys seem to
have higher and more significant impact than girls across outcomes (Table A9). 21 20 Estimating the regressions using ordered probit or ordered logit would be more appropriate but they limit the estimation models we can use. 
21 In additional heterogeneity analysis, we test whether the effect of graduate leaders varies by the following characteristics of the leader: whether the 
leader is criminally accused, leaders wealth, whether the leader is affiliated to the state ruling party, and leaders caste. We do not find any conclusive 
evidence of heterogeneity of impact based on these characteristics. These results are available on request. 
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Table 7 
2SLS estimates of the impact on schools (DISE data). 
All States Low HDI Medium HDI High HDI 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Total number of schools 
Fraction of seats won −74.31 −268.1 −143.3 336.0 ∗∗
by a graduate (94.53) (168.4) (198.1) (143.6) 
Observations 3405 1329 1075 1001 
First stage F statistics 52 31 19 25 
Index of school facilities 
Fraction of seats won −0.170 −0.456 −0.109 0.676 ∗∗
by a graduate (0.250) (0.412) (0.291) (0.336) 
Observations 2687 1010 940 737 
First stage F statistics 56 40 25 22 
Log of average school grant 
Fraction of seats won −0.263 −0.585 −0.718 0.894 ∗
by a graduate (0.340) (0.517) (0.507) (0.541) 
Observations 2646 1012 931 703 
First stage F statistics 57 40 23 21 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. PCA for school facilities is generated using data on school 
facilities such as access to girls toilets, safe drinking water, boys toilet, electricity and computers. Log of annual average funds refers to average 
total funds received by schools in the districts under School Development Grant, School Maintenance Grant, Teachers Grant and other grants. 
Close elections are defined as election between a graduate and a non-graduate in which the difference in vote share between the winner and 
the runner up is less than 3 percent. All regressions control for proportion of seats that had close election in district, vote margin (linear), year 
fixed effects, district fixed effects and state specific year fixed effects. ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1% level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5% level. ∗ Significant 
at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5.3. School outcomes 
Next we investigate the potential channels of the impact on children’s outcomes. One possibility is that educated politi-
cians invest more in schools by directing resources to schools in their constituencies and this results in better learning
outcomes. On average, higher spending has been shown to positively impact outcomes ( Jackson, 2018 ). Spending in school-
ing could be more directly impacted by leaders as they have a more direct role to play in deciding and channeling funding
to schools. We analyze the impact of leaders on total number of schools, index of school infrastructure, and grants received
by the school. 22 All dependent variables for school outcomes from DISE data are averaged at the district level and the unit
of analysis is the district-year. 
Similar to child level outcomes, we find that graduate leaders result in more number of schools (increasing access to
schooling), better school infrastructure and higher average school grants in their district in highly developed states (column
4 Table 7 ). An additional graduate leader in the district (i.e. a 10 percentage point increase on average in the number of
educated leaders in the district) increases the number of schools by 33.6 and average school grant by 8.9% in high-HDI
states. The impact on the number of schools and school grants holds for rural schools and the magnitude is even higher. 23 
But there is no statistically significant impact of educated leaders on school outcomes in the less developed states or in the
overall sample (column 1–3 of Table 7 ). 24 
In addition to the evidence of better allocation of resources, some other channels through which political leaders can
have an impact are through better monitoring and lobbying of local bureaucracy as they are ex-officio members of various
education committees. They may influence teacher attendance rates. 25 Also educated leaders can act as role models for
constituents and that in turn can positively impact learning outcomes in highly developed states. O’Connell (2018) finds
that a policy mandating quotas for women in local government in India substantially increased school enrollment rates of
adolescent girls through a role model effect. 26 Unfortunately, we do not have data to test these additional channels. 22 All these data are sourced from DISE. Data on number of schools is from 2006 to 2014. The infrastructure index is the first component from principal 
component analysis (PCA) of school facility indicators such as access to girls toilets, boys toilet, safe drinking water, electricity, and computers for years 
2010 to 2014. Data on the amount of school grants is from 2010 to 2014. 
23 We cannot generate PCA only for rural schools as data on school infrastructure in district aggregate files is not disaggregated by region. 
24 The OLS estimates are presented in Table A10 and the reduced form estimates are presented in Table A11 in the appendix. 
25 DISE does not have information on teacher attendance but ASER has some limited data on teacher attendance from a selected list of schools. Using this 
data we find no significant effect on teacher attendance; however, this may not be a conclusive evidence because the data is not from any representative 
sample of schools. 
26 On similar lines, Anukriti and Chakravarty (2019) discuss the potential role model effect on citizens’ fertility behavior of a policy imposing fertility 
limits on local politicians in India. 
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 5.4. Robustness analysis 
We put our results to robustness checks in this section to investigate if varying the specification or range of political
leaders who are supposed to have an impact changes our results. We present the results only for the highly-developed
states, for which we find an impact of educated politicians. 27 
5.4.1. Different lag periods 
Let us consider that the policies an educated leader implements may take time to show an effect on the outcomes.
A priori it is not clear how long it takes for a policy to show effect after its implementation, therefore this remains an
empirical issue. The main model discussed above consider the leaders over the last three years (current year and the past
two years). This measure is similar to the one used by Clots-Figueras (2012) who finds a significant positive effect of having
female versus male politicians on education of citizens. As a robustness exercise, we use different lag periods, in particular
the average over the last four years (Lag 3) and two years (Lag 1), to measure the explanatory variable. Irrespective of the
lag period used, the effect of graduate leaders, in comparison with non-graduate leaders, remains statistically significant for
almost all outcomes (Table A12) including school outcomes (Table A13) in high-HDI states. 
5.4.2. Varying degrees of polynomials in vote margins 
Given the fuzzy regression discontinuity design of our empirical model, it is important to control for polynomials in the
vote margins so that any effect of the vote margin itself is controlled in a flexible way. This ensures that the instrument
exploits variation only in the close neighborhood around the discontinuity to justify a quasi-random assignment of treat-
ment. While the main regressions include first order polynomials, our results are robust to using second and third order
polynomials as well (Table A14 and Table A15). 
5.4.3. Alternative definition of close election 
For the main results, we define close elections as those where the margin of victory is less than 3%. We test whether
the results are robust to alternative cut-off points of 1%, 2%, 4% and 6%. 28 We find that the results remain qualitatively
unchanged for most of the outcomes (Table A16 and Table A17). 29 
5.4.4. Placebo test examining the effect of future leaders 
Next we conduct a placebo test where the outcome variable is regressed on the fraction of seats won by graduate leaders
from the future. Since the leaders being considered in the analysis are from the future they should not have an impact on
current learning outcomes. We estimate the impact of leaders who would be in office after 1 year, 2 years or 3 years from
the point when the outcome is measured. Table A18 shows the results for learning outcomes in the highly developed states.
The effect is not significant and much smaller in size. This bolsters the credibility of our main results. 
5.4.5. Effect of alternative levels of leader’s education 
Finally, we also compare between educated and less-educated leaders considering alternative threshold levels of edu-
cation. Specifically, we compare leaders who passed the secondary school (10th grade) with those below that level. Alter-
natively, we compare between leaders with higher-secondary (12th grade) degree and those without it. We find that the
results are qualitatively unchanged (Tables A19 - A22). These additional estimates are not as precise as the main results,
possibly because a comparison based on graduate degree provides higher variation for identification. 
6. Discussion 
Why do graduate politicians have an impact on schooling outcomes only in the highly developed states? We postu-
lated that difference in preferences of constituents, in levels of basic infrastructure, and in quality of students and educated
leaders in low and high developed states may be reasons for heterogeneous impact of educated leaders. We present some
evidence on these hypotheses below. 
Citizens are likely to value education more in the highly developed states than in the less developed states. We do not
have data at state constituency level on priorities and preferences of citizens, so we present some indirect evidence on why
we think this may hold. First, citizens in developed states, by the virtue of having higher levels of human development,
are likely to have higher intrinsic preference for education. Second, the structure of the economy in highly developed states
may magnify the role of education in people’s livelihood. A basic sectoral analysis of data on state domestic product from
2004–05 reveals that the share of service sector in net state domestic product (NSDP) was significantly higher in high-HDI
states (55%) than low-HDI states (42%). In contrast, the share of agricultural sector in NSDP was much higher in low-HDI27 We have conducted these robustness checks for the overall sample and all the sub-samples, and our main findings are unchanged. 
28 We also follow the recent literature on optimal bandwidth selection to determine the close-election cut-off in a specification that estimates the effect of 
graduate leaders on next year’s education outcomes. Across different outcomes, the optimal bandwidth varies in a range which is similar to the alternative 
cut-offs we present in this robustness analysis. 
29 The effects on enrollment and school funds become imprecise in a few cases when alternative cut-off points are considered to define close elections. 
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 states (25%) than high-HDI states (16%). Jobs in the service sector require the workforce to be better educated than in the
agricultural sector. Hence, high-HDI states are likely to show greater demand for good quality education than low-HDI states.
Therefore, in these states, leaders put greater effort in improving education outcomes and our results show that graduate
leaders are more effective in doing so. 
Another reason we find significant effect of a graduate leader only in the highly developed states is probably because
these states already have that basic level of development to complement leaders’ input and make it effective. Indeed, in
terms of various education related developmental indicators such as state spending, school grants, infrastructure and pupil-
teacher ratio, high-HDI states outperform other states in the baseline data. The average state expenditure on education
per enrolled child was more than double in high-HDI states (Rs. 4540) as compared to low-HDI states (Rs. 2107). 30 Also
teacher transfer regulations are better defined and implemented in high-HDI states ( Ramachandran et al., 2015 ). Thus, the
institutional support system already existing in highly developed states enables graduate leaders to yield better education
outcomes in their constituencies. Also, there is no impact in low-HDI states indicating that lower base in these states may
not make it easier to have an impact. 
We find that educated leaders do not implement policies that target students based on performance level, contrary to
our hypothesis. To show this, we consider binary dependent variables that capture learning outcomes at different levels
of difficulty ( Table 6 ). We find that the effect of educated leaders is significant for all levels of learning in the high-HDI
states. However, none of them is significant in the low-HDI states (results are available on request). In other words, even
low achieving students in high-HDI states are benefited from having a graduate leader, while top learners in low-HDI states
do not benefit by having a graduate leader. Therefore, we dismiss the hypothesis as a possible explanation for the heteroge-
neous results. 
Quality of graduate leaders is better in high-HDI states and this may lead to graduate leaders in these states having an
impact. High-HDI states have better quality education institutions – 54% of the top 100 universities ranked by the University
Grants Commission of India are in the high-HDI states and only 16 percent in low-HDI states. Assuming that a vast majority
of graduate leaders study in the institutions of their own states, the quality of education of graduate leaders is better in
high-HDI states. Better quality education raises the marginal value of a graduate degree. Hence the education and skill
differential between graduate and non-graduate leaders is larger in high-HDI states than in low-HDI states, making graduate
leaders relatively more effective only in high-HDI states. 
7. Conclusion 
Formal education of the leader has been used as a proxy for the quality of the leader without much evidence on the
efficacy of educated leaders. Recent changes in laws in some states in India have used this notion to bar less-educated cit-
izens from contesting elections. In this paper, we investigate whether having more-educated state representatives results
in better learning and schooling outcomes. We find that the impact of more-educated politicians is heterogeneous across
Indian states. In the most developed states educated politicians help improve learning outcomes and schooling resources.
But in the overall sample and in less developed states educated politicians are no different from less-educated politicians.
We find that educated leaders possibly impact learning outcomes through their impact on school access, infrastructure and
funding. The impact of educated leaders depends on the context and it is possible that less-educated leaders also acquire
relevant skills through means other than formal education. So we interpret our results to be against imposing a blanket
ban on less-educated leaders from contesting elections as done in a few states in India. Also, from the perspective of “de-
scriptive representation”, leaders who are from similar backgrounds as citizens represent their interest better ( Mansbridge,
1999; Aaldering, 2017; Gallego and Curto-Grau, 2019 ). In the context of India, a candidate restriction policy based on formal
education may lead to a loss of representation of the interests of a major part of the population who are less educated. 
Our findings advance the literature on the quality of leaders. We are the first, to the best of our knowledge, to analyze
the link between politicians education and competency in India. Nonetheless, the results are subject to several important
caveats. First, the results are specific to the outcomes in education. Educated leaders might get better, same or worse out-
comes than less-educated leaders in other areas such as economic growth, health or environment which are not analyzed
in this paper. Second, we only analyze state assembly leaders and the impact of education of leaders might be different
at the national or the local level. Third, due to the limitations of data we analyze leader characteristics only at the district
level and not at the individual constituency level for which they are elected. Leaders are elected for a constituency and each
district has on average nine constituencies. But the lowest unit of identification in the data on outcomes is the district, so
we aggregate leader characteristics at the district level before ascertaining the impact. The precision of our estimates might
be sensitive to this averaging of leader characteristics at the district level. 
Finally, our identification strategy uses close elections to estimate the impact of educated leaders. Even though we control
for the proportion of close elections in the district and provide some suggestive evidence of external validity of our results,
leaders (educated and less-educated) might behave differently in close elections vis-a-vis non-close elections. If political
competition is lower in constituencies with non-close elections, then the leaders there may spend resources differently and
this may not be captured in our empirical analysis. 30 Calculated using data on state expenditure from the Reserve Bank of India. 
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